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Subsidiary Violations Under the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
By Alexandra L. Anderson*
Abstract: Following a watershed of suspected covert proliferation in Iran, legislators
and scholars have searched for more effective ways to isolate Iran from the global
energy market and financial systems. Prior sanctions played a crucial role in the
international anti-proliferation architecture, but unilateral and non-comprehensive
multilateral embargoes failed to achieve their desired deterrent effect. Now, with the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA), the Obama
Administration expands extraterritorial sanctions to hold U.S. parent corporations
liable for the sanctionable activity of their foreign subsidiaries. While the ITRA
marks a turning point in the sanctions game between the United States and Iran, the
Act is unlikely to deter Iranian leaders from their nuclear program. This Note sets
out key risks of the ITRA’s economic, enforcement, and diplomatic approach, and
argues that the United States, if serious about talking Iran down from the nuclear
cliff, must look beyond its unilateral measures and engage the international
community in a realistic and timely way.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After three decades of escalating sanctions, some compare the history
of Iranian proliferation to the much-loved Sunday comic strip “Peanuts.”1
The storyline is an American classic—Lucy invites Charlie Brown to kick
the football. When he refuses, Lucy promises to hold the ball steady,
telling him: “This time, you can trust me.” The reader knows that Charlie
Brown will never kick her football, but he keeps trying as Lucy finds new
ways to play him for a fool. Since the dawn of the atomic age, such has
been the relationship between Tehran and the West. The allure of security
and the prospect of reaching those nations that remain impervious to
international cooperation encouraged the United States, much like Charlie
Brown, to choose optimism over experience. But as Iran’s nuclear ambitions
grow dangerously close to fruition, the United States has devised a new way
to kick Iran’s proverbial football. With the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA),2 the Obama Administration expands
1
See, e.g., Islamic Republic Pulls the Football Away from IAEA, IRAN TIMES (June 14, 2012, 4:04
PM), http://iran-times.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4235:islamic-republicpulls-the-football-away-from-iaea&catid=100:whats-right&Itemid=425; Rick Moran, West Plays Charlie
Brown to Iran’s Lucy, AM. THINKER (May 27, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/05/
west_plays_charlie_brown_to_irans_lucy.html.
2
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 101
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extraterritorial sanctions to hold U.S. parent corporations liable for the
sanctionable activity of their foreign subsidiaries. In doing so, the ITRA
places extraordinary pressure on those who still conduct business with Iran,
however indirectly, to limit their activity.
Following a watershed of suspected covert proliferation in Iran,
legislators and scholars have searched for more effective ways to isolate
Iran from the global energy market and financial systems. Prior sanctions
played a crucial role in the international anti-proliferation architecture, but
unilateral and non-comprehensive multilateral embargoes failed to achieve
their desired deterrent effect. While the ITRA marks a turning point in the
sanctions game between the United States and Iran, the Act is unlikely to
deter Iranian leaders from their nuclear program as “inflexibly imposed,
escalating [American] sanctions begin to lose their value as leverage to
elicit changes in Iranian policy.”3 The United States must now look beyond
unilateral measures and engage the international community to develop
multilateral sanctions that can be applied and enforced uniformly.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II recounts a brief history of the
United Nations’ attempts to stifle proliferation threats through international
arms limitations and disarmament agreements. It also provides the
background information necessary to understand the United States’ early
efforts to sanction Iran beginning with the Reagan Administration. This
part explores the preexisting framework for individual and business
liability created by the United States’ Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010. Part III sets out key risks and, specifically, the legal,
economic, and political implications of the ITRA’s unilateral approach. In
Part IV, this Note examines the virtue of engaging the international
community as an alternative to the ITRA. Finally, Part V argues that the
imposition of multilateral sanctions would better serve the economic,
enforcement, and diplomatic goals that Iran sanctions need in order to be
truly effective.
II. BACKGROUND: CHANGING APPROACHES TO ANTIPROLIFERATION
In many ways, the United Nations’ early efforts to curb nuclear
proliferation in Iran through international arms limitations and
disarmament agreements provided the United States with a preliminary
framework for its own sanctions regime. As a careful review of the Iran
(2012) (describing Congress’s intent to “compel[] Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability and other threatening activities . . . through a comprehensive policy that includes economic
sanctions, diplomacy, and military planning, capabilities and options”).
3
WILLIAM LUERS ET AL., THE IRAN PROJECT, WEIGHING BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 29 (2012).
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and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 reveals, however, even as U.S.
sanctions flowed with increasing severity, each program proved vulnerable
to evasion and non-compliance.
A. Early International Efforts
The use of sanctions dates back to ancient Greece. As early as 432
B.C., Pericles issued the Megarian Decree—an order restricting the entry of
Megara products into the Athenian marketplace.4 This peacetime embargo
brought Megara to the brink of starvation, placed significant pressure on
Sparta to invade Athens, and ultimately triggered the Peloponnesian War.5
Since then, sanctions continued to play an important role in military and
diplomatic endeavors. Often described as “collective action against a state
considered to be violating international law,” sanctions are executed to
“compel that state to conform [to the law].”6 These measures can be
symbolic in nature—a boycott of international events, the refusal to extend
diplomatic recognition—or economic-based.
Over the last hundred years, restrictions on international trade and
capital flows have found particular favor as international cooperatives
sought to legitimate a more effective way to undermine the leadership of
rogue nations.7 While economic sanctions often accompanied military
action during the nineteenth century, following World War I these tools
were seen as a low-risk alternative to armed conflict.8 Woodrow Wilson
firmly believed that “[a] nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight
of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and
there will be no need for force.”9 Such was the underlying rationale for
several U.N. resolutions inspired by World War II’s new “language of
atomic warfare”10—measures that began to outline the collective
4

Chen-yuan Tung, China’s Economic Leverage and Taiwan’s Security Concerns with Respect to
Cross-Strait Economic Relations 93 (May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins
University).
5
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 72–73, 118 (M. I. Finley ed., Rex Warner
trans., 1972).
6
M. S. DAOUDI & M. S. DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 5–8 (1983).
7
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 11 (1990); see also Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, Sanctions: Neither
War nor Peace, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 187, 189 (2003) (“Formal legal discussion of the legitimacy of
paciﬁc blockades, or sanctions more generally, did not occur until the twentieth century with the
formation of the League of Nations and then later of the United Nations.”).
8
Kimberly Ann Elliott, Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Sanctions, THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sanctions.html.
9
WOODROW WILSON & SAUL K. PADOVER, WILSON’S IDEALS 108 (1942).
10
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City (Dec. 8, 1953), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1953, 813, 815 (1960) [hereinafter Eisenhower Address].
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obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states.
In 1970, the United Nations’ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became the first binding, multilateral treaty aimed
at arms limitation and disarmament by nuclear-weapon states.11 At its core,
the treaty sought to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament.”12 Article II of the NPT imposed important
restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon states as well:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control
over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.13
With only a few confirmed and suspected nuclear-weapon states refusing to
sign the treaty or withdrawing from it entirely,14 the NPT’s regime created
an international norm against nuclear-weapon proliferation.
Still, one provision of the NPT created a conspicuous opportunity for
circumvention: Article IV affirmed the “inalienable right of all the Parties
to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes.”15 For non-nuclear states, this caveat allowed for the
enrichment of “natural uranium (0.7 percent U-235) to fuel grade (~3
percent U-235)” for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.16 Article IV also
encouraged “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy” between nuclear and non-nuclear states.17 As one observer noted:
“From there it is a short step to weapons-grade highly enriched uranium

11

See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S.
161 [hereinafter NPT], available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml.
12
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNODA, http://www.un.org/
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
13
NPT, supra note 11, art. II.
14
Non-signatory states include Israel, India, and Pakistan. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in
2003. See Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), JEWISH
VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/nptsigners.html (last
updated Feb. 2012).
15
NPT, supra note 11, art. IV.
16
THOMAS C. REED & DANNY B. STILLMAN, THE NUCLEAR EXPRESS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE BOMB AND ITS PROLIFERATION 144 (2009).
17
NPT, supra note 11, art. IV.
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(HEU: over 90 percent U-235).”18 Even with nuclear states sharing
technology and material in compliance with the NPT, an unconditional
right to the peaceful application of nuclear energy brought non-nuclear
states one step closer toward advanced bomb capability. The “Atoms for
Peace” program illustrates this dangerous tradeoff well.
In 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower announced to the General
Assembly of the United Nations a plan to harness the constructive, rather
than the destructive, use of atomic energy with a proposed International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the helm.19 He promised that “[e]xperts
would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture,
medicine and other peaceful activities . . . to provide abundant electrical
energy in the power-starved areas of the world.”20 Under the program,
countries like China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Hungary, and Cuba pledged to
forgo their development of nuclear weapons in exchange for the atomic
equipment, facilities, and information necessary to develop and operate
nuclear power plants.21 Iran was also a beneficiary of the IAEA’s nuclear
transfer program subject to certain transparency and verification
safeguards,22 and between 1986 and 1996, it was the seventh largest
recipient of overall technical assistance.23 During its early energy
development days, it was the United States that supplied Iran with highly
enriched uranium and a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.24 Iran continued to
sign non-proliferation agreements in exchange for an American supply of
uranium, and this continued until Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 when
the United States terminated the arrangement under President Carter.25
18

REED & STILLMAN, supra note 16, at 144. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is considered weaponsgrade when enriched to 90 percent U-235 or higher. See Uranium Production, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/fuelcycle/centrifuges/U_production.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2013).
19
Eisenhower Address, supra note 10, at 821; see also DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 9 (1997), available at
http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf.
Under the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, which came into force on July 29, 1957, any member state could
“request the assistance of the Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services,
equipment, and facilities” for peaceful atomic energy projects. Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 273 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 [hereinafter IAEA Statute], available
at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html. To ensure the peaceful use of these nuclear resources, the
United States implemented a system of safeguards and inspections through bilateral treaties. See
LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR ORDER 36
(1987).
20
Eisenhower Address, supra note 10, at 821.
21
IAEA Statute, supra note 19; FISCHER, supra note 19, at 326.
22
See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, at 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/214 (Dec. 13, 1974).
23
FISCHER, supra note 19, at 326.
24
Semira N. Nikou, Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Activities, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: THE IRAN PRIMER,
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
25
Id.
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By 1998, the Clinton Administration openly announced its opposition
to Iran’s continued nuclear energy program and the construction of light
water power reactors despite Tehran’s insistence that its goal was energy
production.26 While “[n]uclear technology, materials, and know-how are
dual use in nature, meaning they have peaceful and military applications,”27
separating a country’s peaceful intent from proliferation ambitions
remained difficult. With limited opportunities to police violations, the
“Atoms for Peace” program threatened to become “atoms for war”28 and a
focus on enforcement mechanisms soon took priority.
Of course, the United States was not alone in its efforts. As early as
the mid-1970s, proliferation worries triggered the U.N. General Assembly
to adopt formal texts like Resolution 3472, a comprehensive study on
nuclear-weapon-free zones.29 Mindful that “nuclear-weapon-free zones
constitute one of the most effective means of preventing the proliferation,
both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons and for contributing to the
elimination of the danger of nuclear holocaust,” the United Nations created
“[a]n international system of verification and control” for disarmament
norms and global nuclear non-proliferation.30 But even with regional zone
prohibitions, inspection requirements, fact-finding mandates, and special
enforcement protocol,31 suspected proliferation in the 1990s by countries
like North Korea, Syria, and Iraq continued to threaten international peace
and security.32 Both the United Nations and individual states turned to
economic sanctions as a means of forcing non-proliferation compliance
amidst the growing sense that the NPT and other collective security
systems had failed.33
To reach these new threats, targeted sanctions emerged as one of “the
twenty-first century’s most effective and important new counterterrorism
and counterproliferation tools” for obstructing illegitimate nuclear

26

Id.
MATTHEW FUHRMANN, ATOMIC ASSISTANCE: HOW “ATOMS FOR PEACE” PROGRAMS CAUSE
NUCLEAR INSECURITY 2 (2012).
28
Id. at 1.
29
G.A. Res. 3472, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3472(XXX) [A-B] (Dec. 11, 1975).
30
Id. For a list of U.N. treaties related to nuclear-weapon-free zones including the Treaty of Tlatelolco,
the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Bangkok, the Treaty of Pelindaba, and the Treaty on a NuclearWeapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, see Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, UNODA, http://www.un.org/
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
31
Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Comparative Chart, CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD.,
cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/apmnwfzc.pdf (last updated May 5, 2011).
32
The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984.
33
See, e.g., Steve H. Hanke, On the Failure of the Iranian Sanctions, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/
publications/commentary/failure-iranian-sanctions (last visited July 24, 2013) (noting that “sanctions have
failed to force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program” and that “sanctions have a long history of
failure”).
27
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programs.34 With the United Nations’ ongoing focus on curbing zones of
proliferation, the case for harsher economic sanctions against Iran gained
momentum following a string of reports issued by IAEA and the SecretaryGeneral’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change.35 By
2011, few could deny that Iran had continued to pursue an illicit nuclear
program despite unilateral and multilateral regulation.36 Based on credible
evidence provided by Iran, Member States, and the IAEA’s own research,
an Annex to the Director General’s November 2011 Report concluded, for
the first time and with unprecedented certainty, that Iran has pursued
activities “that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive
device . . . .”37 On September 13, 2012, the IAEA passed a resolution
expressing “serious concerns” about Iran’s nuclear program and scolded
the country for defying U.N. Security Council resolutions that required the
suspension of all uranium enrichment.38
Given this growing body of evidence, some argue that “Iran has yet to
be meaningfully sanctioned” for any of these violations39 and “that the price
the international community has exacted from this regime for its violations
has thus far been remarkably low.”40 Some blame the absence of strict
sanctions on Iran’s economic relationship with countries like China and
India,41 while others cite a lack of “superpower” initiative and cooperation
with the IAEA.42 As the following section explains, however, the United
34

Orde F. Kittrie, New Sanctions for a New Century: Treasury’s Innovative Use of Financial
Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 789, 819 (2009).
35
U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
36
Director General, Atoms for Peace, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA,
GOV/2011/65, para. 43 (Nov. 8, 2011) (citing evidence of Iran’s efforts to “procure nuclear related and
dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities,” to “develop undeclared
pathways for the production of nuclear material,” to acquire “nuclear weapons development information
and documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network,” and to create “an indigenous design of
a nuclear weapon including the testing of components”).
37
Id. para. 43.
38
Steve Hunegs & Pirouz Irani, Setting the Record Straight After Ahmadinejad’s U.N. Speech,
MINNPOST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/09/setting-record-straightafter-ahmadinejads-un-speech.
39
Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and Consequences of Failure to Enforce
Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 519, 520 (2007).
40
Id. at 548.
41
Timothy Gardner & Roberta Rampton, U.S. Extends Waivers on Iran Sanctions to China and
India, REUTERS (DEC. 8, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/12/07/usa-iran-sanctons-india-idINDE
E8B60DB20121207; Timothy Gardner, U.S. Extends Waivers on Iran Sanctions to 11 Countries,
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-usa-iran-sanctions-idUSBRE
92C0YQ20130314; Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann, The Coming Collapse of Iran Sanctions,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/
iran-sanctions_b_2758738.html.
42
Jamie Lang, International Sanctions: The Pressure on Iran to Abandon Nuclear Proliferation, 6
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 141, 166 (2007).
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States began levying transaction regulations on Iran for a number of
reasons, including Iran’s active pursuit of nuclear capability, as early as the
Reagan Administration.
B. The Birth of an American Framework
1. Foundations: The 1996 Sanctions Act and 2010 Comprehensive
Sanctions Act
The U.S. government has implemented several programs aimed at
restricting market access for individuals and companies engaged in Iranian
commercial transactions. For example, under Executive Order 12613,
President Reagan issued an import embargo on Iranian goods and services
pursuant to Section 505 of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 1985.43 In 1995, President Clinton tightened sanctions
with Executive Order 1295744 and Executive Order 12959.45 Pursuant to
the statutory authority of the International Security and Development
Cooperation Act of 198146 and the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 1977,47 all U.S. persons were prohibited from participating
in Iranian petroleum development.48
Congress soon passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (1996
Sanctions Act), a measure that authorized the President to impose sanctions
on individuals and foreign financial institutions knowingly engaged in new
economic transactions valued in excess of $40,000,000 “that directly and
significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop
petroleum resources of Iran.”49 For the first time, the U.S. government
targeted specific industries in the Iranian marketplace under the assumption
that “limiting the development of Iran’s and Libya’s petroleum resources
would deny them the revenues produced by such resources and thereby
deprive them of the financial means to support acts of international

43

Exec. Order No. 12613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 29, 1987) (applying to all goods or services of
Iranian origin except “(a) Iranian-origin publications and materials imported for news publications or
news broadcast dissemination; (b) petroleum products refined from Iranian crude oil in a third country;
[and] (c) articles imported directly from Iran into the United States that were exported from Iran prior to
the effective date of [Executive Order 12613]”).
44
Exec. Order No. 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995) (prohibiting any U.S. person or
entity from developing petroleum resources in Iran).
45
Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995) (expanding previous sanctions on
Iran to include a total investment and trade embargo).
46
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, 95 Stat.
1519 (1981).
47
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (1977).
48
An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations Involving Sanctions Against Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.txt.
49
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. § 5 (1996).
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terrorism.”50 By 1997, the Clinton Administration’s sanction regime
banned virtually all investment and commercial activity with Iran.51
In light of Iran’s suspected clandestine nuclear program, Congress
amended the 1996 Sanctions Act to impose economic sanctions in September
of 2010. With the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act (2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act), Congress banned
investments of $20,000,000 or more that supported the development of
petroleum resources in Iran.52 Restrictions also included the selling,
leasing, or provision of “goods, services, technology, information, or
support” that contributed to “the maintenance or expansion of Iran’s
domestic production of refined petroleum products, including any direct
and significant assistance with respect to the construction, modernization,
or repair of petroleum refineries.”53 Finally, the 2010 Comprehensive
Sanctions Act authorized the President to impose sanctions on any
individual or entity for selling or providing Iran with refined petroleum
products over a certain value.54 There was still a prohibition on the
importation of all goods, services, and technologies of Iranian origin, with
few exceptions.55
The United States’ current sanctions policy was born out of the 1996
and 2010 Acts, where, for the first time, individuals and businesses could
be held liable for a very specific class of commercial transactions with Iran.
These new restrictions marked an aggressive attempt to persuade Tehran to
address growing concerns about its prohibited nuclear activities, and the
State Department believed that the imposition of sanctions on nonAmerican companies for supporting Iran’s energy sector “sen[t] a stern and
clear message to companies around the world” about the consequence of
non-compliance.56 By 2010, foreign companies had a choice: sever
business ties with Iran or lose access to the American financial and
commercial marketplace. The U.S. government based this new foreign
policy tool on three primary objectives:
(1) [T]o block the transfer of weapons, components, technology,
and dual-use items to Iran’s prohibited nuclear and missile
programs; (2) to target select sectors of the Iranian economy
50

Richard G. Alexander, Note, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Congress Exceeds Its
Jurisdiction to Prescribe Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601, 1602 (1997).
51
Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997).
52
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th
Cong. § 102 (2010).
53
Id. (applying to “goods, services, technology, information, or support” with a “fair market value
of $1,000,000 or more”).
54
Id. § 102(a)(3)(A)(i).
55
Id. § 103 (information materials, humanitarian aid, transactions incidental to travel).
56
Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(May 24, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164132.htm.
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relevant to its proliferation activities; and (3) to induce Iran to
engage constructively, through discussions with the United
States, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Russia . . . to fulfill its nonproliferation obligations.57
While prior sanction programs reflected “a cumulative effort by the
United States to prevent money laundering and illicit transactions that
endanger United States national security,”58 there was a growing sense that
“[d]ue diligence and audits for correspondent banking with foreign
financial institutions [might] not be sufficient to protect against industrious
Iranian actors.”59 The 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act relied “heavily
on self-reporting, including user certifications based on the best knowledge
of United States financial institutions, which [could] be deceived by evershifting front companies and evasive measures by Iran.”60
Furthermore, American corporations escaped liability for the Iranian
transactions of their foreign affiliates if neither the American firm nor a
United States citizen was involved in the prohibited activity. For example,
following a May 2011 determination that Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)
had violated the 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act by delivering “at least
two cargoes of reformate to Iran . . . worth approximately $50 million,”61
the Obama Administration clarified that 2010 Act restrictions did not apply
to U.S.-based subsidiaries (like CITGO, an American affiliate operated by
PDVSA).62
Section 102(g) further narrowed the economic impact of the Act,
which included a “special rule” giving the President discretion over all
sanction determinations.63 To avoid liability under the 2010 Comprehensive
Sanctions Act, a firm need only take “significant verifiable steps toward
stopping the activity” and provide “reliable assurances” that they will not
engage in any future prohibited activity.64 A number of energy investment
57

Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2012).
58
Jennifer M. Kline, Comment, When Comprehensive Falls Short: The Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 3 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 219, 252 (2011).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act, supra note 56. Venezuela
subsequently branded PDVSA’s designation under the Comprehensive Sanctions Act as a violation of
international law and an “imperialistic aggression” by the United States. See Posición del Gobierno
Bolivariano ante Sanciones de EE.UU. Contra PDVSA, PARTIDO SOCIALISTA UNIDO DE VENEZUELA (May
25, 2011), http://www.psuv.org.ve/temas/comunicados/posicion-gobierno-bolivariano-ante-sanciones-eeuucontra-pdvsa/.
62
Briefing on the Latest Sanctions on Iran, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 24, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164170.htm.
63
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th
Cong. § 102(g) (2010).
64
Id.
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companies also received exemptions under this “special rule,” including
Total of France, Statoil of Norway, ENI of Italy, Royal Dutch Shell of
Britain and the Netherlands, and Inpex of Japan.65 Consequently,
policymakers realized that the 1996 Sanctions Act and the 2010
Comprehensive Sanctions Act were anything but ironclad, and several
members of the 112th Congress began to advocate for new methods of
enforcement.66 President Obama also made security interests, including
Iran’s nuclear program, a central theme in his 2012 State of the Union
Address.67 New sanctions on Iran soon followed.
2. New Restrictions Under the ITRA
On August 10, 2012, President Obama signed the ITRA, a bipartisan
bill that expands the scope and severity of prohibitions against Iran while
increasing the number of companies that are now subject to those
sanctions.68 Unlike its predecessors’ inability to tie non-U.S. subsidiary
violations back to an American parent company, the ITRA authorizes the
President to take action against the parent corporation of a foreign firm that
engages in any of the following transactions with Iran: (1) joint ventures
related to the development of petroleum resources or the mining,
production, or transportation of uranium, (2) the transportation of Iranian
crude oil, (3) the concealment of crude oil or refined petroleum products of
Iranian origin, (4) the provision of underwriting or insurance or reinsurance
services, or (5) the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance
of Iranian debt.69 The ITRA also amends Section 13 of the Securities and
65

KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 15 (2013).
See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Congress Clears New Sanctions on Doing Business with Iran, BUS. WK.
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-01/congress-clears-new-sanctions-ondoing-business-with-iran (quoting comments by Chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, declaring the Iranian energy sector “off limits” and urging Congress to “stop Iran
before it’s too late”); Congress Takes Aim at Iran’s Nuclear Program, Oil Income with New Sanctions,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57485099/congress-takesaim-at-irans-nuclear-program-oil-income-with-new-sanctions/ (referencing comments by Senator Tim
Johnson, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, about faltering “negotiations between the West
and Iran over its uranium enrichment”).
67
See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (Jan. 25,
2012), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/25/2012state-union-address-enhanced-version#transcript (“And we will safeguard America’s own security
against those who threaten our citizens, our friends, and our interests. Look at Iran. Through the power
of our diplomacy, a world that was once divided about how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program now
stands as one. The regime is more isolated than ever before; its leaders are faced with crippling
sanctions, and as long as they shirk their responsibilities, this pressure will not relent. Let there be no
doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options
off the table to achieve that goal.”).
68
See generally Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th
Cong. (2012).
69
Id.
66
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Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers of stock traded on U.S. exchanges
to disclose any activity by it or an affiliate that violates the new sanctions
law.70 Companies must now report on an annual or quarterly basis any
instance of prohibited activity by it or any of its affiliates, and these
disclosures must contain a “detailed description of each such activity,
including—(A) the nature and extent of the activity; (B) the gross revenues
and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity; and (C) whether the
issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue
the activity.”71 Furthermore, while an entity must “knowingly” engage in
prohibited activity in order to trigger a violation under the ITRA, an
unwitting U.S. parent company can potentially be liable for its failure to
report any violations by a foreign subsidiary or affiliate that it owns or
controls.72 Following the SEC’s periodic reporting and public disclosure of
any sanctionable activities, the President is then required to complete a
sanctions determination within 180 days after beginning an investigation.73
Elsewhere, the ITRA modifies the President’s authority to issue
compliance waivers or suspensions. Under Section 9(c) of the 1996
Sanctions Act, the President could waive sanctions when it was
“important” to the United States’ national interest.74 Under Section 102(c)
of the 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act, waivers were reserved for
instances deemed “necessary” to preserve the national interest.75 After the
ITRA, however, waiver authority for energy-related sanctions includes
only those instances “essential to national security interests.”76 The
“weapons of mass destruction” standard has also been limited to only those
70

Id. § 219. The ITRA specifically amends Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
adding a new subsection outlining 10-K and 10-Q form disclosure requirements for “certain activities
relating to Iran.” Notably, Section 13(r) of the 1934 Act contains no materiality threshold or de
minimums exceptions.
71
Id.
72
Id. Under Section 218, a parent company’s ownership over “a partnership, association, trust,
joint venture, corporation, or other organization” is deemed sufficient for the purposes of the ITRA if it
holds “more than 50 percent of the equity interest by vote or value,” it maintains “a majority of seats on
the board of directors,” or it exercises significant “control [over] the actions, policies, or personnel
decisions of the entity.” Id. § 218(a). The ITRA defers to the 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act’s
definition of “knowingly,” which finds actual knowledge, or knowledge that a person should have
known, sufficient for parent company liability. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th Cong. § 101(6) (2010).
73
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 219
(2012).
74
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. § 9(c)(1) (1996) (“The President
may waive the requirement in [S]ection 5 to impose a sanction or sanctions on a person . . . 30 days or
more after the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that it is
important to the national interest of the United States to exercise such waiver authority.”). The
President was required to include a “specific and detailed rationale for [his] determination” in any
Section 9(c)(1) report. Id. § 9(c)(2).
75
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 § 102(c).
76
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 205.
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waivers that are “vital to the national security interests.”77 These
restrictions, coupled with new SEC disclosure requirements under Section
219 of the ITRA, signal a substantial broadening of the United States’
sanctions regime.78
The ITRA threatens to restrict a non-compliant company’s access to
the U.S. market, but it also exposes principals and corporate officers to
sanctions and direct civil penalties in their individual capacity.79 Under the
Emergency Economic Powers Act, it is “unlawful for a person to violate,
attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any license,
order, regulation, or prohibition issued.”80 Such violations can result in a
civil penalty of $250,000 or “an amount that is twice the amount of the
transaction that is the basis of the violation.”81 These new penalties surely
incentivize institutional and individual compliance, but as Part III explains,
the corresponding legal, economic, and diplomatic implications of the
ITRA cast a dark shadow on its efficacy.
III. PRACTICAL AND POLICAL TROUBLES OF THE ITRA
A. Exceptionalism and the Extraterritoriality of American Sanctions
Law
Before the ITRA’s practical implications for corporate liability,
compliance, and social externalities can be determined, one must first
examine the Act’s extraterritorial application. Often, the United States’
ambitious attempt to direct the actions of foreign actors and impose
sanctions for non-compliance is accompanied by questions of legitimacy.82
When the government began regulating individuals and entities with no
connection to the United States under the 1996 Sanctions Act, some viewed
the government’s expanded view of extraterritorial jurisdiction as
“unreasonable and a contradiction of the central precept of international
law that all nations are of equal status.”83 Just as the 1996 Sanctions Act

77

Id.
See, e.g., What Public Companies Need to Know About Broadened Sanctions and New SEC
Reporting Requirements Under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, GIBSON DUNN
(Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/BroadenedSanctions-NewSECReporting-Requirements-Iran-Syria.pdf.
79
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 218.
80
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (1977).
81
Id. § 1705(b).
82
See, e.g., Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S.
Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159 (1987); Ray Takeyh & Suzanne Maloney, The Self-Limiting
Success of Iran Sanctions, 87 INT’L AFF. 1297, 1301–05 (2011).
83
Alexander, supra note 50, at 1634. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasizing the fundamental importance of sovereign equality
in international law precepts).
78
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and 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act found validity under domestic law,
however, so too might the ITRA.
Although Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of U.S.
citizens, both inside the territorial boundaries of the United States and
abroad, there remains a general assumption that Congress legislates with a
presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.84 This
canon concerns the undesirable conflict between American domestic law
and that of other sovereign states, but the presumption is overcome where
Congress has expressed an intent to extend the application of federal law
beyond its territorial jurisdiction.85 Unlike other securities-related law
where the Supreme Court has found statutory language insufficient to
overcome this presumption against extraterritorial application,86 economic
sanctions like the 1996 Sanctions Act and 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions
Act invoke the authority of the Emergency Economic Powers Act or rely
on direct congressional authorization to justify their extraterritoriality.
Both Acts included express extraterritorial provisions, and both statutes
track a growing trend toward the extraterritorial application of U.S.
sanction law that began, perhaps most notably, with the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977.87
As for the Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President of the
United States has the power to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such
threat.”88 This authority includes the ability to regulate or prohibit financial
transactions or transfers in the United States.89 Furthermore, when the
extraterritoriality of the Emergency Economic Powers Act was subsequently
challenged in 1981, the Supreme Court affirmed the President’s broad
authority to act in Dames & Moore v. Regan.90 There, Justice Rehnquist
interpreted the statute to include “congressional acceptance of a broad
scope for executive action” during national security, foreign policy, or
84

See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“We assume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption
against extraterritoriality.”).
85
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
86
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (noting that “there is
no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially” and thus finding no
extraterritorial jurisdiction).
87
Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815,
818 (2009) (“[T]he number of U.S. lawsuits where American laws are applied extraterritorially to solve
global problems has grown. This trend, however, is not peculiar to the United States. Increasingly
other countries are also applying their laws extraterritorially to exert international influence and solve
transboundary challenges.”).
88
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977).
89
Id. § 1702.
90
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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economic emergencies.91
In the case of Iran, the U.S. government has frequently used the
Emergency Economic Powers Act’s extraterritorial reach to levy sanctions
on Tehran via executive order.92 This began after the 1979 Iran hostage
crisis, when the country was named a threat to national security and more
than $12 billion in Iranian government assets—assets that were under the
control of U.S. individuals or entities—were cut off under the Carter
Administration.93 Since then, Presidents have used their emergency power
to impose targeted economic sanctions and block Iranian assets that flow
through American financial institutions and their subsidiaries. Analogous
legislation usually followed.94 A prominent example of the expanding
application of authority under the Emergency Economic Powers Act came
soon after September 11, 2001. When President Bush signed Executive
Order 13224, he authorized a bar on U.S. transactions with entities found to
be supporting international acts of terrorism.95 The order also named and
sanctioned certain Iranian-linked financial institutions connected with
Tehran’s nuclear program.96 By 2005, the President had the authority to
freeze the assets of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their
supporters via the Emergency Economic Powers Act and other related
statutes.97
With the seeds of extraterritorial sanctions sown, the gradual
expansion of jurisdiction continued in other areas of federal law as well.
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, American corporations and their
officers were prohibited from making bribes to foreign officials.98 In 1998,
amendments to the Act extended its jurisdiction beyond the territorial
United States, and for the first time, subjected foreign nationals and entities
to prosecution.99 Over the years, the Department of Justice has been
relatively successful in its efforts to target foreign corporations under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. For instance, in 2008 the Department of
Justice reached an $800 million settlement with German company Siemens
for the $1.7 billion in kickbacks that four of its subsidiaries paid to Iraqi
91

Id. at 656. This decision, though several decades before Morrison, underscores the difference in
Court deference when it comes to issues of national security (rather than mere securities regulation).
92
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (President Jimmy Carter);
Exec. Order No. 12957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995) (President William J. Clinton); Exec.
Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995) (President William J. Clinton); Exec. Order No.
13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (President George W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13574, 76
Fed. Reg. 30,505 (May 23, 2011) (President Barack Obama).
93
Robert Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 247 (1981).
94
For example, the enactment of 1996 sanctions under President Clinton followed Executive
Orders 12957 and 12959.
95
Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 § 1 (Sept. 23, 2001).
96
Id.
97
Exec. Order No. 13382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 § 1 (June 28, 2001).
98
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006).
99
Id. § 78dd-3.
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officials in exchange for contracts.100 In 2010, the Department of Justice
similarly accused British defense contractor BAE Systems PLC of
misreporting compliance and creating shell companies to conceal the bribes
it made to Saudi officials in exchange for a profitable fighter jet contract.101
BAE paid the United States $400 million over the charges.102 More
recently, Pfizer agreed to pay $60.2 million in fines after the multinational
pharmaceutical giant was charged with bribing officials in eight countries—
including China, Italy, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Russia—to approve and use its
drugs.103 In all of these instances, the U.S. government fortified its position
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act applies to non-U.S. entities for bribes
made anywhere, even when there has been no participation by a U.S.
affiliate. From the Justice Department’s perspective, all that Congress
requires is some connection with the United States.104 A comparable
justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction has been applied to sanctions
law, and the ITRA appears to sit comfortably among these invocations of
extraterritorial legal authority even if it stretches foreign jurisdiction to new
limits.
Not surprisingly, however, the extraterritorial application of economic
sanctions has long caused tension between international law and the United
States’ counter-proliferation efforts.105 While the U.N. Charter does
authorize the Security Council to call upon member states to use the
“complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations”106 to quell “any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,”107 the Charter itself is rooted in
100
Erin Fuchs, The Largest-Ever Corporate Payouts to the US Over Foreign Bribery Charges,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2012 6:59 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-largest-fcpa-settlements2012-8?op=1.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
SEC Charges Pfizer with FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 7, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-152.htm; Pratap Chatterjee, Pfizer Admits Bribery in Eight
Countries, CORPWATCH (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15765.
104
This interpretation is not unfounded. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (making it “unlawful for any
issuer organized under the laws of the United States . . . or for any United States person that is an
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or a stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such
issuer, to corruptly do any act outside the United States”). The Act prohibits issuers from making offers
or payments to any foreign official for influence of inducement purposes. Id. § 78dd-1.
105
Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,
56-57 (2001) (arguing that extraterritorial measures “have long been criticized as violating [traditional
public international law] principles, since they purport to exercise authority over foreign states and
entities for engaging in conduct (business with third countries) that has no jurisdictional nexus with the
sanctioning state”); Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1249
(2011) (citing protests and WTO proceedings initiated by the European Union following the passage of
the United States’ 1996 Sanctions Act).
106
U.N. Charter art. 41.
107
Id. art. 39.
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principles of sovereign equality.108 Under this theory of nation-state
autonomy, the 1996 Sanctions Act was met with overwhelming
condemnation and characterization as an encroachment on customary
international law.109 Prior to the ITRA, the U.S. government appeared more
sensitive to these claims: due to heavy protest by the European Union, for
example, the government refrained from imposing 1996 sanctions on
European firms that conducted business in Iran and Libya.110 Given further
limitations on presidential discretion under the ITRA,111 however, future
waivers will likely be less forthcoming.
Now, even amidst heavy disapproval from countries like China and
Russia, the United States has wholeheartedly embraced the extraterritorial
application of the ITRA.112 Leaders in Tehran condemn the Act’s coercive
penalties,113 of course, but it remains unlikely that the United Nations or
any other international authority will mount a successful anti-sanctions
campaign against the legitimacy of the ITRA. Even the European Union,
once strongly opposed to the United States’ extraterritorial regulations, has
taken a similar maximalist approach after recently expressing “serious and
deepening concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme.”114 In October of
2012, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union placed “additional
restrictive measures in the financial, trade, energy, and transport sectors”
and “prohibit[ed] all transactions between European and Iranian banks.”115
At first blush, this development and others appear to be good news for the
United States’ broad economic isolation strategy. But with the emergence
of separate U.S., European, and U.N. sanction frameworks, many firms
find themselves caught between conflicting standards of compliance.116
108

Id. art. 2, para. 1.
Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 929
(2009) (noting that the 1996 sanctions “were vehemently condemned as ‘extraterritorially’ illegal by the
U.S.’s major trading partners, some of whom enacted their own retaliatory laws to block or offset any
damage to their companies’ business interests”).
110
See KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS (2013); Charles
Tait Graves, Extraterritoriality and Its Limits: The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 21 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 715, 722 (1998).
111
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
112
Stephen Lendman, U.S. Sanctions on Iran Mockery of Rule of Law, TEHRAN TIMES (Aug. 4,
2012 3:21 PM), http://www.tehrantimes.com/component/content/article/100281 (arguing that the ITRA
imposes “illegitimate sanctions on Iran” and “mocks rule of law legitimacy”).
113
Id.
114
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON IRAN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Oct. 15,
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132833.pdf.
115
Id.
116
E.g., S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) (banning the provision of militaryrelated materials, training, financing, and other assistance but giving member states considerable
latitude in the implementation and exercise of various asset control, inspection, and seizure activities);
Security Council Adopts Fourth Round of Iranian Sanctions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 518 (2010)
(citations omitted) (The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 requires “arduous
negotiations, [but] its sanctions are weaker than those initially sought by the United States and some
109
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This uncertainty, coupled with the ITRA’s new monitoring and reporting
costs, places a tremendous burden on American parent companies.
B. Reporting Challenges and the Difficulty with Unilateral
Enforcement
Although financial reporting requirements are not new in the United
States, Section 219 of the ITRA does pose significant challenges for
companies that conduct business in the Middle East, especially banking
institutions, shippers, and insurers.117 Of particular concern is the Act’s
“knowingly” requirement.
Not only does knowing engagement in
prohibited activities under the 1996 Sanctions Act and the 2010
Comprehensive Sanctions Act trigger a violation under the ITRA, Section
219 requires that corporations report instance of prohibited activity by any
of its affiliates as well.118 The trouble with this disclosure requirement,
however, is that the term “knowingly” as defined by the ITRA, 2010
Comprehensive Sanctions Act, and 1996 Sanctions Act “with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual
knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
result.”119 The test for what a parent company “should have known” has
been left intentionally vague by Congress, and the unresolved question of
what precisely creates liability (management oversight, control flaws, etc.)
encourages cautious over-reporting. Intuitively, an entity’s best defense is
massive due diligence—an endeavor that requires companies to “check
their ability to produce, maintain and retrieve evidence of such due
diligence.”120
Companies must also implement and maintain internal detection and
reporting systems that build on those already required for various securities
laws. In circumstances where the capacity to track certain transactions for
both a parent company and its affiliates is lacking, the ITRA requires
immediate compliance regardless of burden or cost. But a firm’s ability to
like-minded European allies (notably France, Germany, and the United Kingdom).”). The European
Union imposes its own sanctions on Iran, but those restrictions still allow Iran to use foreign-held euros.
U.S. Senators Call on EU to Tighten Iran Sanctions on Eve of Talks, PRESSTV (Feb. 26, 2013, 6:15
AM), http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/02/26/290849/us-urges-eu-to-tighten-iran-sanctions/ (“In a
letter to President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy on [February 25, 2013], 36 US
senators urged the union to close ‘a significant loophole in US-EU sanctions policy’ in order to increase
pressure on Iran.”).
117
See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 219
(2012).
118
Id.
119
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, H.R. 2194, 111th
Cong. § 101 (2010).
120
David Savage & Kate Hill, The Iran Threat Reduction Act—Insurers and Reinsurers Beware,
LEXOLOGY (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5b232505-d27a-48d3b5b3-1805b09d180d.

143

ANDERSON_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

3/12/14 9:21 PM

34:125 (2013)

obtain and disclose information about its foreign affiliates can be incredibly
difficult, especially when a parent corporation has technical ownership over
a distant, third-party affiliate entity but no actual control.121 No matter how
the issue is framed, liability exposure for multinational corporations and
international business executives is vast, even amid good-faith vigilance
and compliance efforts. At bottom, the most any firm can do is review its
internal monitoring and reporting system to ensure that it captures all Iranrelated activities, and do it quickly. The ITRA’s safe harbor period (which
allowed entities or individuals to avoid civil penalties if they terminated
ITRA-prohibited transactions within 180 days after its enactment) ended on
February 6, 2013.122
Finally, an increase in the number of entities covered by the ITRA,
coupled with a surge in the volume of new reporting, forces the
government rely heavily on the information supplied to it. This is
especially true with respect to foreign firms, where the U.S. government’s
access to financial information and evidence sufficient to initiate an
enforcement action remains limited.123 On this basis, many foreign firms
have an incentive to under-report. Thus, the ITRA appears to overstep the
U.S. government’s capacity to monitor and fully enforce the statute’s terms
in an even-handed way. Given the regulatory scheme and the high cost of
compliance, the question remains: are the ITRA’s unilateral restrictions
worth it? The next section considers the Act’s corresponding effect on
Iran’s currency, food staples, and low-income families.
C. The Impact of Sanctions on Iran’s Domestic Economy
Also present in the ITRA debate—apart from extraterritorial issues
and the challenges faced by private firms amidst broadening liability and
reporting requirements—is an agenda that undervalues the impact of these
new economic restrictions on ordinary Iranian citizens.124 While it is too
early to determine whether the ITRA will finally curb Iran’s nuclear
program, history suggests that regardless of their cost, Tehran will not be

121
New Requirements for SEC Reporting Companies to Disclose Certain Iran-Related Activities
and Transactions, SKADDEN SEC. REGULATION & COMPLIANCE ALERT (Oct. 5, 2012), available at
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-requirements-for-sec-reporting-comp-53312/.
122
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 1905, 112th Cong. § 218(d)
(specifying that civil penalties do not apply if a United States person or entity “divests or terminates its
business with the entity not later than the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act”).
123
Michael Volkov, Sanctions Violations, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://corruptioncrimecompliance.com/2012/09/sanctions-violations.html.
124
Amir Salehzadeh, A View from Inside Iran: What Sanctions Do to Real People, POLICYMIC
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/60541/a-view-from-inside-iran-what-sanctions-doto-real-people.
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discouraged from its nuclear ambitions.125 Still, the new prohibitions strike
at the heart of Iran’s vital energy sector, which provides approximately
80% of the country’s export revenues.126 At the beginning of October
2012, Iran’s rial lost more than 25% of its value against the dollar.127 Since
the end of last year, Iranian currency has depreciated by over 80% as the
price of staples like vegetables, milk, and bread has doubled.128 Pervasive
unemployment, essential medicine shortages, and even food riots have also
been reported.129
As one commentator notes, “[o]rdinary Iranians
completely unconnected to the government have had their lives effectively
ground to a halt as the sudden and unprecedented collapse of the financial
system has rendered any meaningful form of commerce effectively
impossible.”130
This begs the question of whether, as a policy matter, the ITRA’s
implications for human suffering can and should be justified. Former
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked this question in 1996
(when similar financial sanctions were imposed on Iraq), and she
concluded: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the
price is worth it.”131 The growing threat of a nuclear-armed Iran likely
engenders a similar attitude from within the Obama Administration. For
example, just as the rial began to lose much of its value in the fall of 2012,
then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton blamed Iran’s financial struggles on
the choices of its own government, not ITRA sanctions.132 Secretary
Clinton also eluded to a remedy “in short order” if Iran backed down from
its disputed nuclear program, but made no mention of whether a severe dip
in the Iranian standard of living could also trigger some kind of
alleviation.133
Additionally, the misery of an entire population, while limited in its
direct effect on Iranian political leaders, poses another challenge by stifling
125

A Red Line and a Reeling Rial: Sanctions May be Taking Their Toll as Israel’s Prime Minister
Tries to Set a New Red Line to Block Iran’s Nuclear Plans, ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2012) [hereafter A Red
Line and a Reeling Rial], http://www.economist.com/node/21564229; BIJAN KHAJEHPOUR ET AL.,
NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL, “NEVER GIVE IN AND NEVER GIVE UP”: THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON
TEHRAN’S NUCLEAR CALCULATIONS 26 (Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://www.niacouncil.org/
site/DocServer/Never_give_in__never_give_up.pdf?docID=1941 (“No data suggests that Iran’s nuclear
program overall has slowed down over the course of the past four years. Iran’s stockpile of low
enriched uranium (LEU) has grown from 839kg in November 2008 to 8271kg in February 2013 . . . .”).
126
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127
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Id.
129
Id.
130
Murtaza Hussain, Sanctioning Society: From Iraq to Iran, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210373854792889.html.
131
60 Minutes: Punishing Saddam (CBS television broadcast May 12, 1996).
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Clinton: Sanctions Can be Eased if Iran Cooperates, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/
IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=286514.
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resources for societal change.134
According to a report from the
International Civil Society Action Network, “[t]he urban middle class that
has historically played a central role in creating change and promoting
progress in Iran are key casualties of the sanctions regime.”135 If one goal
of the ITRA is to force political change by making Iran’s economic
environment unbearable, perhaps the harsh regulation’s “unintended”
consequences are anything but accidental.136 Unfortunately, an absence of
market stability may have the undesirable consequence of limiting
activities related to, or driving ordinary Iranian citizens away from, the
democratic movement.137 This is especially true if the events in Iran unfold
as Israel’s former Minister of Finance, Yuval Steinitz, predicts.138 By the
end of the year, he believes that the ITRA and other sanctions will cause
the Iranian government to lose a minimum of $45 billion in oil revenues,139
a significant hit for an industry that brought in $69 billion in net estimated
export revenue in 2012. If this brings the Iranian economy to the verge of
collapse and Tehran still refuses to comply with international nonproliferation mandates, alternative diplomatic solutions may be foreclosed
as nations like Israel grow increasingly impatient and threaten imminent
military action.
IV. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS: THE COMPREHENSIVE
SOLUTION TO A UNILATERAL DILEMMA
With major economic powers now determined to squeeze the air out
of the Iranian economy, the underlying objective—to maintain peace and
security in the atomic age—remains a legitimate one. The threat of nuclear
proliferation, like other conspicuous struggles in American and world
history, is “not the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are
134
Mohammad Sadeghi Esfahlani & Jamal Abdi, Sanctions Cripple Iran’s Middle Class, Not the
Regime, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 2, 2012), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/02/sanctions_
cripple_irans_middle_class_not_the_regime.
135
ICAN, KILLING THEM SOFTLY: THE STARK IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE LIVES OF ORDINARY
IRANIANS 6 (2012).
136
In a recent interview with Charlie Rose, for example, Madeleine Albright said that she believed
the ITRA sanctions were “working because we hear an awful lot about problems within the Iranian
economy.” This suggests that “problems” are precisely the aim of the United States’ coercive economic
strategy. See Press Release, CBS News, Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Says Sanctions
Against Iran “Are Working” – on “CBS This Morning” (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.cbspressexpress.com/
cbs-news/releases/view?id=34652. But see KHAJEHPOUR ET AL., supra note 125, at 14 (“Supreme
Leader Khamenei has remained steadfast in his approach to sanctions. The escalating sanctions regime
has enabled him to strengthen a powerful pre-existing narrative that portrays Western powers as a
brutal, immoral group of governments out to ‘get’ Iran, and that their core interest is to keep Iran
underdeveloped and dependent.”).
137
Esfahlani & Abdi, supra note 134.
138
A Red Line and a Reeling Rial, supra note 125.
139
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virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected, even to
the end of time, by the proceedings now.”140 Thus, the need for an
immediate, non-violent resolution to Iran’s runaway nuclear program will
likely take precedent over general claims of sovereign equality and
independence. The following section explores the virtue of engaging the
international community as an alternative to the ITRA or similar sanctions,
highlighting opportunities for enhanced compliance, improved reporting
and enforcement, and the reinvigoration of diplomatic negotiations.
A. Enhanced Compliance Through International Agreements
It remains true that the ITRA’s broad extraterritorial application
creates a strong disincentive for firms to provide energy-related services,
insurance, and shipping assistance to Iran. But China, India, and Russia
have long expressed dismay over the imposition of unilateral sanctions.141
Even before the ITRA became law, each pushed for, and received,
temporary exemptions based on their own economic interests.142 This trend
continues as the ITRA’s all-inclusive approach makes compliance
unworkable in the face of some countries’ refusal to accept them. In the
absence of an exemption or temporary reprieve, foreign firms are left to
weigh the relative payoff between evasion and acquiescence. Early
indications suggest that some entities have already chosen non-compliance.
For instance, nearly three months after the ITRA became law, the China
Classification Society continued to provide certification services to
sanctioned Iranian maritime vessels.143 Some Russian shipping companies
have also sustained certification services for Iranian vessels in defiance of
the ITRA.144 The trouble with this kind of non-cooperation, of course, is
that these countries are “directly facilitating the ability of the Iranian
regime to circumvent multilateral sanctions that have been imposed to

140

THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 82 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Classics 1986) (1776).
See, e.g., China Defends Iran Oil Purchases After U.S. Sanctions, AL ARABIYA NEWS (June 12,
2012), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/12/220202.html (quoting Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Liu Weimin emphasizing that “China is opposed to one country imposing unilateral
sanctions on another country in accordance with domestic law, let alone imposing sanctions on a third
country”).
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In June of 2012, for example, China received a six-month reprieve from sanctions against
financial transactions related to the purchase of Iranian oil. See US Grants China Six-month Iran Oil
Sanctions Reprieve, BBC NEWS (June 28, 2012 11:23 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asiachina-18639255.
143
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prevent it from further developing its illegal nuclear weapons program.”145
The payoff for evasion, especially when it comes to oil sanctions, can
be significant, and this can have important behavioral and predictive
consequences.
In particular, “the existence of short-term capacity
limitations, reservoir engineering constraints, and the finite resource base in
the petroleum industry substantially attenuate the incentive to cheat.”146
Markets arise wherever there is market demand, and through the broad
extraterritorial application of the ITRA, the United States sought to prevent
foreign entities from filling the commercial voids created by an exodus of
American firms from the Iranian economy following the 1996 Sanctions
Act and 2010 Comprehensive Sanctions Act.147 But the failure of the ITRA
with respect to compliance reflects a polarized discourse between the
United States and the rest of the world. While the United Nations and
many member states support some form of sanctions against Iran,
enforcement norms differ.148 For the ITRA to achieve its intended effect of
isolating the Iranian economy and compelling Tehran to abandon their
nuclear ambitions, compliance must be universal. A multilateral approach
that captures the cooperation of many powerful states within one
international system would, in a sense, better “punish defections from the
rules of the game.”149 With more nations in an enforcement coalition,
fewer are left to circumvent Iran sanctions.150 Economic theory also
suggests that sanctions imposed by allies, rather than adversaries, are often
more effective.151
Similarly, a significant part of this quest for uniformity will require
the United States to enforce its sanctions without exception—something
that it has yet to do. A greater willingness to punish major U.S. trading
partners for violations, including China, would also contribute to the
cogency of the ITRA. This is not to suggest that the economic sanctions on
145
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151
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Iran are not stringent enough. If anything, the ITRA’s blunt, unilateral
approach threatens to alienate allies, corrode the cooperative framework,
and invite “interstate rivalries.”152 Rather than make it more difficult for
foreign countries to comply with the ITRA, a better approach would be to
create “conditions for a return to good faith participation in the
international monitoring system.”153 The United Nations is the most
obvious forum for establishing a universal enforcement norm, and through
mutuality of promise, any non-compliant actors or fringe markets can be
more effectively regulated rather than unilaterally policed.154
B. Improved Reporting and Enforcement Mechanisms
The ITRA’s unilateral approach also creates major problems for
global commodity producers, bankers, insurers, and intermediaries. Many
foreign firms understand the broad contours of Sections 208 and 209, but
few agree on the specifics.155 Accordingly, internal reporting standards for
many independent foreign subsidiaries reflect consistency and quality
issues. With the ITRA and its accompanying surge in new reporting,
however, the U.S. government will have even more difficulty verifying and
following through on all of the information it receives. This means that
“the enforcement of violations is both variable and unpredictable.”156 By
contrast, a coordinated international reporting system, one that uniformly
collects and reviews financial information at the state level, would
harmonize conflicting standards of compliance, increase monitoring
capacity, and improve enforcement.
C. A Stimulus for Diplomatic Negotiations
With major trading partners and buyers of Iranian crude in lockstep
with the United States, the effect of sanctions on Iran’s economy could
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worsen. Even if the country’s citizenry suffers, however, little suggests
that those in power feel pressured to reconsider their nuclear weapons
program. For example, in February of 2013 and just six months after the
ITRA became law, Iran announced that it was marching forward with its
nuclear program by installing 180 new advanced centrifuges, a move that
accelerates the process for uranium refinement.157 Not surprisingly, the
White House responded by threatening “further pressure and isolation.”158
Such discourse reflects a cycle of mistrust and escalation that foreshadows
the United States’ drawn-out, and ineffective, unilateral strategy. While
Iran’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammad Khazaee, suggests
that any successful negotiation between the two countries must include
“mutual respect, respect for Iran’s national sovereignty, non-intervention in
Iran’s domestic affairs, and [the] discarding [of a] two-track policy of
pressure and engagement,”159 economic sanctions remain one of the last
alternatives to direct military action. As a necessary but insufficient means
of achieving Iranian non-proliferation goals, the concern moving forward
should be on the length, rather than the severity, of these restrictions. By
sealing off opportunities for evasion and non-compliance via a new, more
rigorous multilateral agreement, vital industries in Iran will lose revenue
more quickly. The rial will depreciate, and inflation will drive the price of
imports, foodstuffs, and other commodities through the roof. If the Iranian
government could find ways to temper the impact of sanctions before,160 a
swift and exacting imposition of universal restraints could bring its
economy to the brink of collapse sooner rather than later. This, in turn,
may force Iranian leadership to rethink its refusal to engage in serious
diplomatic negotiations with both the United States and the United Nations.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined some of the legal and practical challenges
that American sanctions regimes will face as the point of Iranian nuclear
proliferation draws closer. At present, the international community finds
itself at a critical juncture where new diplomatic and coercive methods are
necessary to punish Iran and some emboldened market actors.161 While the
ITRA was intended to defy the disappointing history of non-proliferation
policy and sanctions practice, the Act fails to achieve the uniform
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application and enforcement that it needs in order to be truly effective.
Issues of international legitimacy, early non-compliance and potential
retaliatory action, increased exposure for non-U.S. subsidiaries,
complications in parent corporation control and oversight, and severe
economic harm to the Iranian populace only magnify an underlying truth—
that the ITRA ultimately fails because it is neither targeted nor
cooperative.162 Even if the prospect of reaching international consensus for
stringent, multilateral sanctions remains remote, the United States, if
serious about talking Iran down from the nuclear cliff, must look beyond its
unilateral measures and engage the international community in a realistic
and timely way.
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KHAJEHPOUR ET AL., supra note 125, at 31 (concluding that a “pressure strategy that lacks the
sophistication and flexibility to help unravel the dominant narrative in the sanctioned state and entice
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